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The European Union’s
aid policy
towards countries involved in the Congo war:
lever for peace or incitement to war?
by Catherine ANDRE and Laurent LUZOLELE LOLA1
May 2001
ABSTRACT
The aim of this article is to show that, in relation to the guiding values and principles governing cooperation with ACP countries, the « differential » management method, applied for reasons of effectiveness on a « case by case » basis, leads to an overall policy that is lacking in coherence and which could be described as having « double standards » in terms of the countries involved in the war in the Congo (Angola, Zimbabwe, Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda). In this particular case of regional conflict, this policy is ineffective in encouraging adoption of and respect for the Lusaka Agreement and does not contribute to creating the necessary conditions with which to stabilise the region, either politically or economically. The EU’s cooperation relations and aid flows to these warring countries are predominantly determined by the guiding principles that link the EU with the ACP countries. These principles are contained in the Cotonou Agreement2, which replaces the Lomé Agreement. They highlight the cardinal importance of the political dimension in issues of Democratisation, the rule of law, human rights, good management of public affairs and conflict management.
For some countries involved in the regional conflict being played out in the Democratic Republic of Congo, these values and principles are considered the foundation and a prior condition of political relations and aid links with the European Union whilst, for others, they are considered to be the necessary result. Sanctions relating to violation of these values and principles may not be - indeed are not - applied in the same way from one case to another.
This differential case by case treatment causes harmful effects, for it determines aid flows and thus, for the countries receiving them, these aid flows offer wide margins for manoeuvre in the waging of war whilst at the same time undertaking a number of economic stability objectives (to be achieved within the context of IMF adjustment programmes, in particular). These countries are differently affected by the cost of the war effort on their budgets. This dual policy does not present the conditions necessary to encourage the adoption and implementation of the Lusaka Peace Agreement; on the contrary, it causes serious and harmful effects both at the level of regional political stability and in terms of achieving growth and development objectives.
And yet Europe and its member States have the means for an effective policy in the region: they are the largest donors in terms of volumes of aid contributed to the different countries involved in the war in the Congo, and the EU strongly supports the IMF adjustment programmes. However, it exerts little political influence, either at the level of the regional conflict, at a bilateral level or within other international institutions. This article describes and analyses the different factors that determine this policy and the harmful effects it causes.
This article aims to show the relative weight of the European Union (here used to refer to the community organs and the member States), in terms of aid flows, in the different countries involved in the war in the Congo (Burundi, Rwanda, DRC, Angola, Uganda and Zimbabwe) and to analyse the factors or principles determining its aid policy. We will then consider whether there are differences between European Union aid in practice and the principles and objectives declared or stated in the Cooperation Agreement with ACP countries. Then, within the context of a regional conflict that requires regional solutions, we will consider whether aid has (or not) the ability to act as an effective instrument and means of exerting pressure in order to encourage the regional peace process and to offer the conditions necessary to sustainable economic and human development in the region.
Our point of departure is the following: does the EU apply double standards in its aid policy with regard to the countries involved in the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo? If so, is this option not in contradiction with European principles and objectives of conflict prevention and resolution within the context of the Great Lakes Region?
In order to answer these questions, we have based our study essentially on an analysis of texts produced by the European Union bodies (Parliament, Council, Commission) through official declarations, speeches and press releases covering the period August 1998 – January 20014. In addition, during our research, we conducted a series of interviews with EU regional representatives. Some reference is also made to international organisations, in this case, the World Bank and IMF, whose positions with regard to the countries in question indirectly influence the EU’s choices. To these sources have been added other primary and secondary sources relating to the European Union and the region in conflict.
In addition, we have systematically considered a series of figures relating to official development assistance and to the macro-economic development of the different countries involved in the Congo war5. We have primarily focussed our analysis on the three countries of the Great Lakes - the DRC, Burundi and Rwanda, - and Uganda, Zimbabwe and Angola.
Cooperation relations between the European Union and the ACP countries are governed by principles that are essential to make the relations and aid effective in terms of sustainable development. In addition, the European Union handles its cooperation relations in a « differential » manner, on a « case by case » basis, using decisions and resolutions taken by international institutions such as, for example, the OECD, the UN Security Council, World Bank and IMF as a reference point.
The relationship between the EU and the ACP countries has evolved from being a relationship that was meant to be first and foremost a commercial one (Lomé 1975) towards a relationship which, since the end of the Cold War, has become increasingly governed by political conditions in terms of human rights, democracy and good governance6. Whilst in 1975, development assistance was considered to be an objective in its own right, towards the end of the 1980s the idea that democracy could be the engine for development began to take root7 and was taken up in the broad guidelines produced by the OECD Development Assistance Committee for member states8. In fact, since 1989, article 5 of the 4th Lomé Convention has explicitly noted the link between human rights promotion and development9. Political conditionality gradually became more formally enshrined in development cooperation relations, first in 1991, through adoption of a Council resolution, and then in 1995, through an amendment to article 5 of the Lomé Convention, signed in November of that year in Mauritius. The most recent Agreement signed at Cotonou in June 2000 politically condition official development aid in articles 8 and 9 of the Cotonou Agreement, signed on 23 June 2000. The introduction of conditionality into cooperation relations is aimed at responding to the issue of stabilisation of ACP countries and conflict prevention. The general policies adopted within the framework of political dialogue between the parties should contribute to peace, security and stability and promote a stable and democratic political environment but also prevent, manage and resolve violent conflict. "[…] peace and democratic stability have become priority areas for cooperation10". Articles 8, 9 and 11 deal with the means for achieving these priorities: the dialogue between parties relates to the regular evaluation of developments in the areas of human rights, democratic principles, the rule of law and good governance of public affairs (Articles 8 and 9). Article 11 of the Agreement considers the political dimension that must work towards peace, prevention and conflict resolution. It stipulates that the parties must follow an active, global and integrated policy of consolidation of peace and conflict prevention and resolution within the framework of a partnership. Article 11 advocates the principle of appropriation. It relates to a policy of developing regional, sub-regional and national skills for the prevention of violent conflict in its early stages by acting directly at its root causes.
Since the end of the Cold War and, more precisely, since the review of the Lomé Convention that was signed on 4th November 1995 between the European Union and the ACP countries, the terms of its cooperation clearly stipulate that respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, democratic principles, the involvement of all in the democratic process, the rule of law and good governance are essential elements of relations between the EU and the ACP countries in terms of harmonious and sustainable developmenta11". Violation of these human rights and principles may lead to consultations and, where appropriate, a suspension of EU cooperation and assistance, as stated in article 366b of the Lomé IV Convention12. Since it came into force, article 366b has been applied to Togo in 1998 and Niger in 1999. Prior to « Lomé IV », consultations or suspensions of European aid took place, on the basis of political decisions, in relation to Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo - DRC) and Sudan. In EU official discourse, these principles and values remain essential elements to be defended within the context of cooperation relations13. In addition, apart from these essential principles, article no. 9 of the new ACP-EU partnership agreement signed in Cotonou on 23rd June 2000 also emphasises conflict prevention and resolution with, amongst other things, a restriction on military expenditure and the need to prevent any redirection of financial aid resources for military purposes14. Violation of these principles may lead to consultations and, where appropriate, a suspension in cooperation15.
Two further factors need to be added to these principles: the so-called « differential » method of handling cooperation itself and the fact that decisions and resolutions taken at the level of international institutions, for example, at the level of the UN Security Council, World Bank or IMF, are used as a reference point.
The « differential » management method is explained in the Green paper, the preparatory document to the Cotonou Agreement. The differential, flexible approach enables the most appropriate method of handling relations to be defined on a case by case basis, according to criteria such as the quality of dialogue on policy, progress noted in policy implementation, the complementary nature of community resources in relation to national effort, or the existence of mechanisms for coordination of external aid on the part of the recipient country16. The adoption of the differential method of handling cooperation is explained by the diversity of ACP country situations, which necessitates the adjustment of EU cooperation policy. It is pointed out that not all of the ACP countries can embark upon a standardised economic and political partnership with the EU. Partnership can only be the result of mutual interests, common objectives and priorities, strictly respected reciprocal rights and obligations. Differential policies and cooperation methods have become essential for reasons of effectiveness17.
The European Union’s policy is influenced by decisions taken within other international institutions such as the United Nations, for example, but also the International Monetary Fund which, in certain cases, acts as guarantor vis-à-vis other donors.
Having determined the broad principles and methods of handling cooperation relations between the EU and ACP countries, we will now consider the nature of European Union aid flows and their volume, in order to ascertain the EU’s impact in the Great Lakes Region.
EU aid is, by and large (more than 85%) official development assistance, of which more than 90% is « bilateral » development aid, that is, country to country aid, made up largely of donations19. The remainder (all aid other than official development assistance) represents a contribution to multilateral agencies. Food and emergency aid have varied over the last decade but the overall trend in recent years has been towards it accounting for an ever increasing share of assistance in relation to structural aid (food and emergency aid formed between 25 and 30% of donations in 1997 and 1998), particularly in Central Africa, as we will see further on20. In order to gain a better understanding of the role that Europe, and particularly the European Union, could play in the region, we have compared the flows of aid from a number of different bilateral and multilateral donors.
The European Union is the most significant donor in the world: the European institutions and member States contribute 56% of all official development assistance and provide 70% of aid in sub-Saharan Africa21. The European Union is also the largest donor to the Great Lakes region (DRC, Rwanda, Burundi), with a share of over 50% of total development assistance (bilateral and multilateral) since the beginning of the last decade (with the exception of 1994 and 1995). For the countries involved in the Congo war as a whole, official development assistance from the European Union has varied between 40 and 50% of total bilateral and multilateral aid. The weight of the European Union and its member States in terms of development assistance is thus relatively more important than that of any other OECD bilateral donor (such as the United States, Switzerland, Japan…).
EU and member States’ share of official development assistance to the Great Lakes (Burundi, DRC, Rwanda) and the countries involved in the war in the Congo as a whole.
Sources : OECD, Répartition géographique des ressources financières allouées aux pays bénéficiaires de l'aide.
Versements, engagements, indicateurs par pays 1990-1994, 1995 ; OECD, Répartition géographique des ressources
financières allouées aux pays bénéficiaires de l'aide. Versements, engagements, indicateurs par pays 1994-1998, 1999.
The European countries’ links with this region are heavily influenced by historical political and economic relations22. Thus, Belgium retains privileged aid relations with the DRC, Rwanda and Burundi, although France and Germany are also significant bilateral donors to these three countries as a whole, even though the proportion of their aid to the region fell from 1994 onwards, in particular to Rwanda.
Evolution
in the proportion of aid coming from Belgium, France and Germany in comparison
with that from the United States in relation to total bilateral aid flows
Sources : OECD, Répartition géographique des ressources financières allouées aux pays bénéficiaires de l'aide.
Versements, engagements, indicateurs par pays 1990-1994, 1995 ; OECD, Répartition géographique des ressources
financières allouées aux pays bénéficiaires de l'aide. Versements, engagements, indicateurs par pays 1994-1998, 1999.
In the case of Rwanda, it is important to underline the reversal of alliances that followed the genocide and the political changes of 1994: the Netherlands and, to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom, have been significant donors since 1994. The change in political elite modified relations with the former "colonial nations": the new Rwandese political elite had links with the Ugandan political elite, which in turn has privileged political and economic links with the United Kingdom. The United States remains a one-off funder in the case of Rwanda.
Evolution
in the share of the large donors to Rwanda
Sources : OECD, Répartition géographique des ressources financières allouées aux pays bénéficiaires de l'aide.
Versements, engagements, indicateurs par pays 1990-1994, 1995 ; OECD, Répartition géographique des ressources
financières allouées aux pays bénéficiaires de l'aide. Versements, engagements, indicateurs par pays 1994-1998, 1999.
Bilateral aid relations with Uganda and Zimbabwe remain heavily dominated by the United Kingdom, although Germany is also a significant partner in terms of bilateral aid. Portugal is an important donor for Angola, as is Spain. Italy has reduced its aid contributions since 1994, and Sweden was also a significant donor between 1990 and 199823. In spite of Elf's economic stake in Angola, France acts neither as an important donor nor takes on a political role within the EU with regard to Angola.
If one compares the aid flows from the United States with those of European countries, it can be observed that US flows of aid are significant but localised and, overall, significantly less than those of the European countries put together. The United States played an important role as an aid donor to Rwanda in 1994 and 1995 but this assistance remained localised, as in the DRC in 1991 and 1992, withdrawing totally from Burundi from 1993 on, between 1992 and 1995 (during the democratic opening) in Uganda, in Angola from 1994 onwards and in Zimbabwe from 1992 on. The United States’ commitment to the region’s countries remains one-off and minimal24, a reflection of their marginal interest in Africa25. However, the United States plays a quite significant role within the international institutions, as we shall see further on26.
According to our interviews with members of the European Union, the European countries’ decision-making power within the legislative and executive bodies of the European Union in relation to an ACP country is held by those who maintain historic privileged relations27. In other words, Portugal and Spain hold relatively important decision-making power in the case of Angola, the United Kingdom in the case of Uganda, Belgium in the case of the Great Lakes Region although, in the particular case of Rwanda, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have played a more important role there since the genocide and the change in political elite. And France? According to Banegas, since Operation Turquoise in Rwanda and its unconditional support to the Mobutu regime, France is now seeking to position itself differently with regard to the Great Lakes Region, particularly at the level of the Security Council but also within the international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF, by taking an alternative position to that of the United States and the United Kingdom28.
4.2.3 Proportion of multilateral aid flows from the European Union in relation to flows of official development aid from other multilateral institutions
Where does the European Community29 stand in relation to other multilateral institutions (IDA, UNDP, WFP, UNHCR…) and what proportion of multilateral aid is financed by the member States through the Commission and the European Investment Bank?
Proportion of European Union aid within total multilateral aid flows to the Great Lakes region in particular (Rwanda, Burundi, DRC) but also to the countries involved in the war in the Congo as a whole
Sources : OECD, Répartition géographique des ressources financières allouées aux pays bénéficiaires de l'aide.
Versements, engagements, indicateurs par pays 1990-1994, 1995 ; OECD, Répartition géographique des ressources
financières allouées aux pays bénéficiaires de l'aide. Versements, engagements, indicateurs par pays 1994-1998, 1999.
The proportion of official development assistance coming from the European Community represents between 20 and 30% of the funding from multilateral institutions as a whole for the Great Lakes Region (DRC, Burundi, Rwanda), with the exception of the years 1994-95, and between 20 and 40% of multilateral flows to all the countries involved in the war in the DRC. Of 6 large multilateral institutions (AfDf, IDA, UNDP, UNHCR, WFP, EC), the European Community allocates the most significant multilateral aid flows to the DRC, Burundi, Rwanda, Angola, Uganda and Zimbabwe. The European Community remained the most important multilateral donor over the period 1990 to 1998.
However, despite the fact that it makes reference to the programmes of the Bretton Woods institutions, the EU has no decisive influence in the decision-making of these international bodies in terms of guiding, implementing and achieving the objectives of their cooperation policy towards the ACP countries and, in particular, those involved in the war in the Congo. On the contrary, at the level of these international institutions (and particularly the IMF and World Bank), it is first and foremost the G7 who are influential, and particularly the United States.
According to the figures for structural aid (EDF) that were provided to us at the European Union, an average fall in structural aid occurred between two periods, the first prior to 1994 (1987-1994), the second after 1994 (1995-2000), as the following table shows.
Average annual amounts of structural aid committed and paid in écus over the course of two periods (1987-1994 and 1995-2000)
Sources : EDF, Engagements II. Evolution chronologique par convention Rwanda, Paiements. Evolution chronologique par convention Rwanda (tableaux) ; EDF, Engagements II. Evolution chronologique par convention Burundi, Paiements. Evolution chronologique par convention Burundi (tables), EDF, Engagements II. Evolution chronologique par convention Ouganda, Paiements. Evolution chronologique par convention Ouganda (tables).
Between the two periods, average annual structural development aid (development projects) fell significantly for Burundi and Rwanda and, to a lesser extent, Uganda. In fact, average annual amounts committed for Burundi fell to 1/15th their previous amount, falling from 50 to approx. 3 million écus between the two periods ; for Rwanda, the amounts committed fell to 1/3 their original amount, in Uganda they fell by ½ (dropping from an average 70 to 35 million per year between the two periods). One of the main reasons for this fall in average amounts of structural aid committed was the change in the type of aid granted. In fact, in this region marked by war and insecurity, the European Union trend has been towards granting more emergency aid than structural development aid30.
According to available data on emergency aid (ECHO) between 1996 and 200131, it can be seen that Angola, Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC absorbed significant amounts of emergency aid through lack of the minimum security conditions enabling effective development aid to be resumed.
Evolution in emergency aid from ECHO to the countries involved in the Congo war (in écus) between 1996 and 2001
Source : ECHO, Contrats par pays, Echostat, 24 April 2001.
Over the last four years (and the year 2001 has scarcely begun), the countries involved in the war in the Congo have attracted 34% of the total emergency aid destined for ACP countries as a whole. Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC alone have attracted 24% of total emergency aid aimed at ACP countries over the last four years. The figures for the last four years are, however, reduced in comparison to 1996/97. Whilst a certain reallocation of aid from development towards emergencies must be noted, the disengagement of the European Community from the Great Lakes region and the different countries involved in the war in the Congo must be particularly highlighted. This development, visible within the European Community is, unfortunately, the sign of a more general withdrawal on the part of the international community in relation to this region and of a growing marginalisation of the region in relation to the rest of the world. The primary reasons for this are a growing political and military instability over the course of the last decade.
This trend towards a growing reallocation of structural (development) aid towards emergency aid is not peculiar to the European Union but can be seen within all of the donors in relation to countries characterised by political and military instability over the last decade, as confirmed by the evolution in the structure of global aid between 1990 and 1998.
The involvement of Rwanda and Uganda in the war in the Congo has not led to a reduction, let alone a suspension in European Union aid to these countries. The EU has continued with its commitments and payments, as can be seen in the following table for 1998 and 199932.
European Community commitments
|
|
1995 |
1996 |
1997 |
1998 |
1999 |
|
BURUNDI |
18 913 365 |
6 097 151 |
825 450 |
196 534 |
199 930 |
|
RWANDA |
1 071 737 |
24 873 642 |
12 213 291 |
9 179 632 |
28 653 560 |
|
UGANDA |
84 891 490 |
42 023 552 |
39 553 109 |
37 988 114 |
55 610 695 |
Source : EDF, Engagements II. Evolution chronologique par convention.
European Community payments
|
|
1995 |
1996 |
1997 |
1998 |
1999 |
|
BURUNDI |
4 311 307 |
-2 685 168 |
-17 378 493 |
-1 761 080 |
50 153 803 |
|
RWANDA |
-11 765 344 |
50 574 144 |
- 867 292 |
4 994 527 |
44 486 167 |
|
UGANDA |
46 528 614 |
10 152 745 |
20 014 622 |
81 786 659 |
41 395 086 |
Source : EDF, Paiements. Evolution chronologique.
In conclusion, it can be stated that the EU has significant weight and decision-making power in terms of official development assistance and by virtue of its privileged historic ties with these countries. It has a considerable comparative advantage in relation to other bilateral and multilateral donors in terms of decisions regarding official development assistance to the countries of the Great Lakes region (Rwanda, Burundi, DRC) and the other countries involved in the war in the Congo (Uganda, Angola, Zimbabwe). Europe and its member States do not use this decision-making power either with other bilateral partners or within other multilateral institutions, apparently leaving the United States to determine the direction of decisions although, in terms of aid, this country has less presence. In the following section we will see that this political « withdrawal » is the result of the internal functioning of EU decision-making processes but also to the particular nature of this regional conflict and the relatively important decision-making power of the United States within some of the international institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank. A disengagement on the part of the European Community in the region can be observed and a partial reorientation of development assistance towards emergency aid.
We will now consider how the total flows of official development assistance to each of the countries involved in the Congo war have evolved over the period 1990-199833 and what the factors that have determined these flows are.
We have seen above how EU policy is determined by certain guiding principles, of which the most important is respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance. Its policy is a differential one, on a case by case basis, and is relatively heavily influenced by decisions taken within other international institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and the United Nations. Aid flows from the European Union and its member States represent approximately 50% of total aid to the countries involved in the war in the Congo. Consequently, we will now look at the evolution in official development assistance flows to each country and the factors influencing the volume of these flows, the policy and attitude of the European Union, the economic policies being followed by the IMF and, then, we will finally see if involvement in the Congo war has had an influence on the volumes of aid sent.
Graph showing the evolution in overall official development assistance (in millions of US$) from bilateral and multilateral donors between 1990 and 1998
Sources :
OECD-DAC, Development cooperation. Efforts and policies of the members
of the Development Assistance Committee. 1994, Report, Paris, 1995,
Table 37 ; OECD-DAC, The DAC Journal. Development Co-operation. 1999
Report, Vol.1., N°1, 2000, Table 25, p.216.
The above graph shows the evolution in official development assistance flows to the different countries of the region. The European Union and its member States are the most significant donors.
Evolution in net transfers and loans
Let us now take a country by country look at European Union policy and the economic reforms undertaken within the context of a structural adjustment process in the different countries (these, in effect, siphon off significant amounts of donor funding), along with other factors that may determine changes in flows of official development assistance.
The DRC saw its overall development assistance fall from 1990 onwards, due largely to the withdrawal of certain bilateral donors (Belgium initially, following events in Lubumbashi in May 1990) and multilateral donors, including the EU, as of January 1992. Aid to the DRC in 1998 constituted no more than one seventh of the aid provided in 1990 (US$ 126 million in 1998 as opposed to US$ 898 million in 1990), and comprised largely emergency aid, although talks commenced this year with a view to a gradual resumption of aid .
In January 1992, the EU suspended its cooperation with the authorities in Kinshasa, primarily for political reasons, following blockages arising in the democratisation process launched in 1990 by the authorities of that time. This suspension related to structural aid. Humanitarian aid and rehabilitation actions continued but armed conflict in the east of the country in 1996-97 and from 1998 to date led to a halt in emergency action that had been commenced prior to 1996. A resumption of EU cooperation and structural aid depends on progress at a political level in terms of cessation of the war and democratic opening. In fact, the European parliament resolution of 18th September 1998, which is based on the United Nations' Security Council resolution of 31st August 1998, emphasises that, « ACP-EU cooperation with the DRC is essential to regional stability and also in order to support the democratisation and development of a country that is emerging from dictatorship; the end of all military hostilities, respect for international humanitarian and human rights conventions and the establishment of democratic institutions are prior conditions to establishing such cooperation ». Referring to the declarations and resolutions of the UN Security Council, the EU Presidency reaffirmed the importance it placed on democratisation in the DRC and on the Lusaka Agreement35. The EU is committed to politically, diplomatically and materially supporting the implementation and application of the Lusaka Agreement36. But, beyond this position, "[…] faithful to a kind of doctrine of indirect commitment, the EU will content itself with offering simple technical and financial support to the OAU and the UN for the application of the Lusaka process37". In May 2000, the General Affairs Council recommended a progressive resumption of structural aid and, in November 2000, the EDF Committee approved a strategic document to consider the possibility of drawing up a rehabilitation programme that would complement the humanitarian programmes that some donors continued to implement in the region. In spite of the glimmer of an opening up on the part of the European Union, its cooperation still consists of « extended » emergency aid. The EU still retains its same position and the implementation of structural programmes thus remains conditional upon progress in the area of democracy and at the level of the Lusaka Agreement, even following the death of Kabila38. It should be noted that the European Union neither officially condemned, nor imposed sanctions because of, the conflict between the Ugandan and Rwandese armies at Kisanganyi in May 2000 but referred to the UN resolution demanding the unconditional withdrawal of Rwandese and Ugandan troops occupying the DRC39. Such a stand on the part of the United Nations indicates there is a tendency to reconsider and redescribe the conflict in the DRC: the DRC was attacked and the aggressors have been named40.
The drop in flows of aid is also due to the IMF's attitude towards the DRC. This organisation had suspended its cooperation with the DRC (Zaire) in February 1992 because the country was no longer paying its overdue financial obligations (it had already been declared ineligible to use the Fund's resources in 1991). In March 1998, the DRC committed itself to rapidly re-establishing a level of monetary stability and recommenced payment of overdue financial obligations during the months of June and July41, and a cautious resumption of monetary reform assistance began to appear on the part of some donors. But resumption of the war meant the DRC was unable to continue its efforts and that aid was withdrawn. Factors of a political nature intervened as the war resumed, which ran counter to a possible resumption of cooperation between the IMF and the DRC.42 At the beginning of the year 2000, a certain level of relations were re-established with the IMF in order to consider the macro-economic policy conditionalities of support for an adjustment programme and reforms controlled by the Fund43 but resumption of cooperation remained conditional, as in 1998, on the payment of overdue financial commitments on the part of the DRC to the IMF.
At bilateral level, Belgium has maintained a position of conditionality44 since 1990, even during the democratic opening formed by the work of the CNS (National Security Council) or the power changes or even at the time of the initiatives for a resumption in cooperation (such as the conference of "friendly countries")45. Since the political changes in 1999, Belgium and, in particular, its Minister for Foreign Affairs, has wanted to play an active role in conflict resolution in Africa. In spite of initiating discussions on a possible resumption of structural aid, and in spite of an increase in the number of meetings, which seemed to be a sign of opening, Minister Michel’s position following the death of Kabila made reference to the European Union’s position and remained fundamentally conditional upon inter-Congolese dialogue, application of the Lusaka Agreement, etc46.
In conclusion, it can be said that although it seems that the European Union and other bilateral and multilateral donors are in the process of adopting a more « positive » attitude towards the DRC, with a possible trend towards seeing the conflict in a different light, the European Union holds the same position, which is conditional upon democratisation, political opening, application of the Lusaka Agreement and dialogue (in accordance with the principles governing its relations with ACP countries). Economic conditionalities have also been imposed by the IMF prior to any resumption in aid.
Bilateral and multilateral relations were broken off and this breakdown represents an additional obstacle to the resumption of cooperation both with the EU, IMF and other donors.
Burundi witnessed a slight growth in its development assistance in 1992-93 under President Ndadaye, and then under his successors up until 1994 (perhaps as the result of support to democratic opening, albeit very cautious). Development assistance began to fall in 1995, dropping sharply after the 1996 coup by the current President Buyoya, after condemnation of the coup by the countries of the region. This condemnation was followed by the international community, who imposed a trade embargo to force the new regime to enter into peace negotiations. The main donors suspended their development assistance.
The EU suspended its development cooperation with Burundi following Buyoya’s coup in 199648, having initially suspended it in 1994 for security reasons. Since July 1998, the EU has been slowly resuming its relations with Burundi, according to Pinheiro because of « signs of progress in peace meetings, and in order to encourage the government of Burundi to continue this process »49. The European Union undertakes its action within the framework of « extended » humanitarian and rehabilitation programmes and financially supports the negotiations and other processes that could contribute to advances towards peace. The Council of European Ministers recommended a bilateral resumption of structural aid on the part of the European Union on 22nd May 2000 but in practice this resumption of aid remains conditional upon real progress at the level of the peace process (active commitment of the parties to the peace agreement, and improvements in respect for human rights, as well as in security conditions)50.
With regard to the IMF, the structural adjustment programme commenced in 198651 was broken off in 1995 because it was veering off course due to the economic consequences of political instability. In spite of ongoing negotiations, the conditionality of political opening still applies at certain levels since the Buyoya coup and, with regard to the criteria for accessing an IMF programme on the part of Burundi, these remain of an economic nature such as good financial management of the country, a stable internal macro-economic environment (in terms of budgets, exchange rate policy, monetary and fiscal policy and a reallocation of military expenditure towards social expenditure), economic criteria that are difficult for Burundi to achieve without external aid, particularly for a country that is incurring heavy military expenditure. Nevertheless, in spite of this, it has achieved a certain external balance52. For the IMF, Burundi is still considered a country in the throws of civil war and thus none of its programmes are appropriate to this situation : the re-establishment of peace, and re-establishment of a certain level of macro-economic stability are two conditions that must be achieved prior to the application of structural adjustment programmes. But the IMF might review its position and consider a resumption of financial support via a programme of post-conflict assistance53. In addition, the sudden breakdown in bilateral political relations on the part of the international community following regional condemnation of the Buyoya coup makes resumption of aid difficult. The World Bank, however, does still retain some projects in Burundi.
At the bilateral level, Belgium funds primarily humanitarian projects. It adopted a more positive attitude, firstly, under the influence of Mr. Moreels, Secretary of State for Development, and then subsequently under Minister Michel, and the image of Burundi is thus changing.
On 11 December 2000, a conference in Paris brought together all the donors in order to help the country out of a civil war and an economic situation described by the World Bank as « untenable ». These donors agreed to grant a budget of US$ 440 million but demanded a cease-fire54 and progress at the level of the peace process.
Although the current attitude towards Burundi could be termed as more « sensitive » to the serious social and economic problems of the country, and in spite of a certain « goodwill » on the part of the EU to resume relations with Burundi, conditions still remain in place in terms of political opening, signing of and respect for the peace agreement on the part of all the parties involved etc.55... It can be considered that the IMF makes a resumption of its relations with Burundi conditional upon economic (economic stability) and political (peace) criteria and the EU puts political conditions on the effective resumption of its structural aid, in terms of progress in the negotiations, respect for human rights and security.
Rwanda witnessed an initial increase in its official development assistance between 1990 and 1993 following the adoption and implementation of a structural adjustment programme. However, this aid doubled after 1994 (reaching US$ 715 million in 1994 and US$ 702 million in 1995), following the genocide and the extensive economic impact caused by the displacement of half its population, beginning to fall once more after 1995, to US$ 350 million in 1998, increasing once more from 1998 onwards. Rwanda is described as « a particularly special case » by the aid institutions, due to the genocide and war and their social and economic impact : the deaths of more than one million people, the displacement of half the population, the total destruction of infrastructure, the return of a million former refugees, the collapse of the whole production sector. Faced with this unprecedented economic and human disaster, the international community reacted rapidly. At the level of the European Union and other institutions, Rwanda has the particular status of « special case » in a period of post-conflict following the 1994 genocide, which has enabled it to benefit from virtually and officially unconditional lines of credit from the EU since 1998.
Following the 1994 genocide, which was the object of no common position on the part of the European Union57, this latter adopted a common position on 24th October 1994 making development assistance conditional upon "concrete efforts at reconciliation" (including return of the refugees), and on a guarantee of pluralism within the Rwandese government58. It was thus that, following the events at Kibeho, the Union suspended its development cooperation for two months (from 12th May to 12th July 1995)59. This attitude was strongly contested within the EU and it was following the Soubestre report in July 1995 that there was a gradual normalisation of relations between the EU and Rwanda. However, it was only following the Adjello report that the conditionality clause was widely questioned, and structural aid programmes slowly resumed (in the areas of agriculture, etc.) from 1997 on60. This conditionality was brought to a complete end by the EU common position adopted in 199861. Since then, at the level of the EU, Rwanda has thus been made an exception, enabling it to benefit from aid granted virtually and officially without condition. In fact, there is a European resolution that summarises the common position of EU member States in favour of Rwanda. This resolution is based on the fact that Rwanda cannot live or reconstruct without external support, whatever the internal situation of the country. This position on the part of member States regarding EU-Rwanda cooperation relations means that there are no texts other than this European resolution to explain the state of these relations over the period covered by this article, that is, from 2 August 1998 to date62.
Rwanda receives important flows of aid channelled via international organisations and NGOs in the areas of human rights, rehabilitation and food security. The country is currently moving from an emergency rehabilitation phase to a more advanced stage of programming the financial resources available from a perspective of structural cooperation. A new indicative national programme of 110 million euros was signed on 9 March 2000. The aim of this programme is to support the government’s efforts in poverty reduction and to consolidate macro-economic reforms (pursued by the IMF) and good governance programmes63. These broad reforms are in line with a debt relief programme (HIPC – Heavily Indebted Poor Countries) spread over 6 years.
Rwanda’s involvement in the war in the Congo is seen as a necessity for the country in order to stabilise politically; this political stabilisation is not possible while the issue of the presence of Interahamwe and ex-FAR troops in neighbouring countries remains unresolved. The Lusaka Agreement represents an angle on conflict resolution that could satisfy Rwandese security issues and the Commission is encouraging Rwanda to respect the Agreement and implement it, emphasising the need for Rwanda to reduce its military expenditure64. Clashes between the Rwandese and Ugandan armies at Kisanganyi did not lead to a suspension of aid or sanctions imposed on Rwanda. The European Union « simply » referred to the resolution adopted by the Security Council in June 2000 requesting the withdrawal of Rwandese and Ugandan troops from the DRC65.
Since 1995, the IMF has directly established a special assistance programme to put the economy and public finance management back on its feet. Rwanda has thus rapidly benefited from IMF support and was placed in a period of pre-programme adjustment, followed by an adjustment programme66. Within this context, Rwanda has rapidly received large sums of aid for reconstruction, plus balance of payments and budgetary aid, which have enabled it, for three consecutive years, to achieve a certain level of internal macro-economic « balance » (monetary, inflation…). Although budgetary and external imbalances are extremely high, they are soaked up and financed from outside. External financing has enabled it to recover a certain level of macro-economic stability with relative speed, which has enabled it to respond to the conditions for accessing debt reduction programmes67. In June1998, because of its efforts to recover a certain level of stability and due to its special status, it was very rapidly admitted onto the HIPC68 debt relief programme, a programme of reforms, aid and gradual debt remission spread over 6 years, even though it did not fully comply with the macro-economic criteria for access. Economic performance criteria are established by the IMF (expressed in terms of reforms to be undertaken, monetary stability to be preserved, inflation rates to be contained, a gradual reorientation of military expenditure towards social expenditure etc.). The threat of suspension of adjustment credit was brandished in 1999 for non-observance of the macro-economic criteria imposed (including failure to keep military expenditure at less than 3.8% of GDP in 1998) but this did not result in the suspension of aid within the framework of the adjustment programme69. In the case of Rwanda, the annual criteria are neither fully achieved nor fully respected70 but the fact they are not achieved leads to no reprisals, as opposed to in Zimbabwe, for example. This is because, firstly, the fact that it does not respect certain economic criteria does little or no damage to Rwanda’s macro-economic stability as long as aid enables it to ensure it can make up for internal and external deficits (thus preserving, in particular, monetary stability) and because, secondly, Rwanda is a special case with valid reason and justification for not achieving the objectives set.
In conclusion, it can be said that no political criteria are imposed in terms of democratic opening, respect for human rights, the rule of law, good governance on a country in the midst of an economic recovery following an unprecedented genocide (in spite of a narrowing of power within the RPF71). Since 1998, it certainly seems that, even if aid to Rwanda is officially conditioned (by reductions in military numbers, etc.), it seems that in practice aid to Rwanda is generally little questioned by the large multilateral institutions, because Rwanda is considered a "special case" and because its significant aid needs are recognised, but also for a number of reasons of a political nature.
Throughout the whole of the last decade, Uganda received more funds than any other country in the region, although official aid showed a downward trend from 1998 on. Official development assistance remained peaked at more than US$ 670 million between 1990 and 1997, dropping to US$471 million in 1998. Uganda has been the object of a number of structural adjustment programmes since 1987. In 1996, it was accepted onto the HIPC programme, leading to a substantial reduction in its debt. It is considered to be the economic leader of the region due to its spectacular economic results from 1992 on, which have led to an international infatuation with Uganda, resulting in an increase in the number of donors and financial aid volumes and a diversification of aid72. As a political leader, Uganda is considered to be congratulated for its democratic progress (at the grassroots)73.
Within the framework of the Lomé Conventions, the European Union participates actively in reconstruction activities following a civil war. Cooperation is aimed at the social sectors, agriculture and the environment, and transport infrastructure. We have neither been provided with nor found any reference texts from the European Parliament relating to decisions or declarations on the situation in Uganda over the period from August 1998 to date. However, in a note relating to conflict in Africa, the EU claimed to be concerned by Uganda’s military involvement in the DRC and reaffirmed that a reduction in military expenditure was an important pre-requisite to continuing its financial support to Uganda74. Following the armed clashes at Kisanganyi, Europe's position was taken with reference to the resolution taken by the Security Council on 16 June 2000 demanding the withdrawal of Ugandan troops from Congolese territory.
Uganda is controlled by the IMF and has been the object of structural adjustment programmes since 1987. In 1996, it became one of the first of the world’s poorest countries to agree to a debt relief programme. Within the framework of this debt relief programme, conditionalities are set in terms of economic performance criteria to be achieved and respected. Whilst a continuation of the structural adjustment programme pursued within the framework of the HIPC is formally conditional upon economic performance criteria, limiting military expenditure etc., in reality, these are hardly a factor even though, in 1999, the IMF delayed payment of an instalment of credit for structural adjustment following its disagreement on the breakdown of expenditure75. Recently, the criteria of an overrun on military expenditure was highlighted, as well as the significant deterioration in terms of trade and fall in tax revenue…but these did not lead to a suspension of aid or of the structural adjustment programme being carried out. On the contrary, Uganda received a second phase of debt relief during 2000, which is being matched by new funds aimed at poverty reduction programmes76. This cancellation of a second part of its debt overlooked a whole secondary group of problems with which Uganda is confronted (problems of corruption, social problems….)77.
Just like Rwanda, Uganda is constantly and firmly invited to reduce its military expenditure; paradoxically, on the one hand Uganda find itself little sanctioned in terms of aid and, in addition, in spite of the repeated calls for a reduction in military expenditure, the Bretton Woods institutions give their agreement to increases in military spending in the budgets (in May 1998, they gave their agreement to an increase of 26% in the Defence budget78). The multilateral institutions claim to be "concerned" by its involvement in the war in the Congo but, apart from the threats they issue, no real sanction in terms of aid has been put in place due to its involvement in the Congo war, nor has the EU officially condemned the Kisanganyi events.
According to de Torrenté, this ambiguous attitude adopted by the donors and, in particular, the Bretton Woods institutions, with regard to Uganda, is the result of a convergence of several concomitant factors following the end of the Cold War: the donors are seeking leader countries in which to apply their new neoliberal development model; Uganda offers both the economic characteristics and conditions favourable to the implementation of this, but also a certain political will79. During the 1990s, Uganda became a "veritable laboratory for aid programmes"80 and a successful model for the neo-liberal reforms of the Bretton Woods institutions. Consequently, the donors find themselves "cornered between their commitments to the "Ugandan model" and the evident military business tendencies of the regime"81. De Torrenté recognises that the donor countries "practise double standards in their method of evaluating the nature of the Ugandan political system or the role of the army": increases in the defence budget are accepted and justified in terms of the fight against insecurity in the north and east of the country, an insecurity that harms the effectiveness of the development model led by the World Bank and the IMF; similarly "movement" democracy is accepted as an alternative to multipartism because, with a multiparty system, the results obtained from economic reforms would not have been so spectacular, the reforms would not have been so effective82.
Having won the so-called « conventional » war against Savimbi, and having signed a peace protocol in November 1994 and respected the ensuing cease-fire, the Dos Santos regime in Angola was recognised as legitimate (resulting from elections) and formal. Since 1994, Angola has experienced an increase in its overall aid (in spite of a significant decrease in EU aid between 1995 and 2000). It has been the object of an IMF structural adjustment programme since 1996.
In spite of a resumption of the war in 1998 after 4 years of peace (signed in November 1994), the EU continued its pro-active approach in support of those who unequivocally wished to participate in the peace process in the Angolan conflict84. According to the staff met at the European Commission, decisions taken regarding Angola are generally based on resolutions or proposals of the Security Council. And « now the conventional war seems to be at an end, peace needs to be won »85. Whilst the EU recognises that internal conflict damages its cooperation with Angola, the war in the Great Lakes region is considered an external factor detrimental to resolution of the internal conflict86.
Angola is now committed to the path of reform and medium term aid programmes have entered a stage of «capacity building». The vast majority of European aid to Angola relates to food aid, economic and social rehabilitation actions (basic infrastructure) and support to the fishing industry. The Commission is ready to support a democratisation process and participates (via the IMF’s structural adjustment programme, in particular) in the formulation of a political, social and economic environment favourable to a democratisation process and to the emergence of the rule of law87.
Angola enjoys a policy of « positive discrimination » from the EU and is placed under structural programmes of a « post-conflict » and reconstruction stage. Angola has been accepted onto a « post-conflict » IMF programme since mid-1996 and is eligible to join the debt relief programme88. Its involvement in the war in the Congo is seen by the EU as a factor aggravating the internal conflict, whilst the IMF sees it as a strategy to fend off Savimbi (breakdown in arms and diamond trade circuits and protection of the Cabinda oil zone)89. However, this internal insecurity heavily damages the implementation and effectiveness of structural reforms, whose social cost of implementation runs the risk of increasing sharply. Although the IMF emphasises the need for transparency in management of public income and expenditure, it has never used lack of respect for economic criteria as a reason to suspend aid or programmes; on the contrary, it endeavours to win over potential donors to the need for massive aid in order to limit the additional social costs caused by delays in implementation of reforms90.
With regard to Zimbabwe, its official development assistance doubled in 1994 (increasing from US$ 358 to 715 million) then falling to US$350 million in 1998. Zimbabwe has been the object of structural adjustment since 1992. However, it is racked by internal problems of agrarian reform and economic problems, and a part of its structural aid was suspended in 1998 following, also, its involvement in the war in the Congo.
Aid from the European Commission to Zimbabwe is focussed on rural development, health and education. A programme of agricultural service management, cofinanced with Dfid and the World Bank, has been prepared and adopted. Zimbabwe receives support from the EU for social sectors within the framework of the structural adjustment programme being pursued by the IMF. Apart from the financing of a certain number of EDF projects, Zimbabwe also receives aid from budget lines of the Commission in support of NGO work as well as the efforts of human rights organisations.
However, since 1998, European cooperation with Zimbabwe has been affected by the political, social and economic situation of this country, by its problems of agrarian reform; the ensuing riots and Zimbabwe’s involvement in the war in the Congo have led to problems on top of the political difficulties currently experienced by the country: a series of planned financing was suspended (such as support to agrarian reform, financing of a trade development programme,…), certain sums of aid aimed at balance of payments support were reallocated to social sector projects following a heavily deteriorating macro-economic situation described as « unclear » and following public finance management described as « poor »92. The Commission maintains its strong support of the Lusaka Agreement and strongly requests that Zimbabwe respect it. Following Zimbabwe’s legislative elections at the end of June 2000, the Presidency of the European Union reacted by congratulating the country but « insistently urging the authorities in Zimbabwe to work with the opposition and civil society to engage in a constructive and open dialogue(...) »: its position remains conditioned by the principles and values on which all EU/ACP relations are based93. According to the Commission, the IMF (jointly with the World Bank) has also frozen its financial support to Zimbabwe’s structural adjustment programme.
In summary, it can be said that, over the course of the last decade, aid flows have been determined by the suspension or resumption of bilateral and multilateral cooperation, and by the economic policies pursued by the IMF, which siphon off significant flows of capital from other institutions and forms of cooperation. Finally, we have seen the extent to which the war has influenced these flows of aid or not. The European Union and its member States are the most significant donors of official development assistance to the countries of the region. We will now look at the factors that determine the policy the European Union pursues in the different countries involved in the Congo war and offer possible explanations of this policy.
How can the European Union’s position towards the countries involved in the Congo war be summarised ? As we have seen, its policy is determined according to the principles that guide relations between the EU and ACP countries, on a « case by case » basis which, in this case however, has led to a policy of « double standards » in terms of aid flows. The EU’s policy heavily depends upon that being pursued by the IMF, on the resumption of a programme and relations and the type of programme undertaken with the country in question. As we have just seen, volumes of aid to the different countries depend largely on the economic programmes being pursued by the IMF. We have seen that the involvement of Rwanda, Uganda and Angola in the war in the Congo has not led to a reduction in, or suspension of aid, for a number of reasons.
The European Union handles its cooperation relations with the ACP countries in a differential manner, on a case by case basis, primarily for reasons of effectiveness of the policies pursued. The IMF also considers its relations with the ACP countries on a « case by case » basis. However, in this particular conflict, this « case by case » policy on the part of the EU and the IMF has led to a policy of « double standards » whose effects are in contradiction with the objectives created and pursued by these two institutions' policies.
An analysis of the EU and IMF’s attitude in relation to each of the countries involved in the war in the Congo shows that :
|
country |
Resumption of aid following suspension |
Continuance of aid |
||||
|
conditioned |
not conditioned |
Conditioned |
Not conditioned |
|||
|
Democ criteria |
Econ. criteria |
"positive discrimination" |
Democ criteria. |
Econ. criteria |
"positive discrimination" |
|
|
Burundi |
* |
* |
||||
|
DRC |
* |
* |
||||
|
Angola |
Post-conflict sitn |
|||||
|
Rwanda |
Post-conflict/genocide |
* |
||||
|
Uganda |
SAP/HIPC |
Level mil. Expend. |
||||
|
Zimbabwe |
SAP |
* |
Mil expend &reforms |
|||
The European Union adopts a so-called policy « positive discrimination » in the case of some countries when the diverging points of view of different member States would not enable it to take a unanimous position (particularly when it relates to aid conditionality). In addition, other factors inherent to the country or to the conflict itself lead the European Union to opt for a more positive policy.
According to our interviews, and according to Manahl, the decision-making power of some member countries is linked to their political and economic interests in each of the countries involved. The amounts of bilateral aid to each country reflects these interests, as we demonstrated above, although not entirely. However, within the European Union, the divergence of political and economic interests and points of view of the different member States is a cause of significant blockage and forces the EU to take coalition decisions which are based finally on the smallest common denominator95 (this explains the lack of consistency and strength in the policy). In spite of an agreement on certain common values, including the defence of democratic principles, the EU member States are not always agreed on a policy of aid being conditioned by democratic progress or security (as was the case in Rwanda between 1995 and 1997). They declare themselves to be more in favour of a policy of « positive discrimination » (as in Rwanda from 1997 on, Angola since 1994, Burundi (but more cautiously, for a real resumption in aid is still conditioned), undertaken on a case by case basis, in spite of there sometimes being real progress made in terms of the values and principles upheld by the European Union in its relations with the ACP countries. Indeed, these principles are contested by some new African political leaders who advocate strong power96.
This is why the EU leans more towards a policy of « positive discrimination », positive conditionality on a case by case basis97. Rather than condition aid on progress made in terms of democratisation, security conditions, good governance and respect for human rights, the EU favours a policy of positive discrimination to encourage peace and stability, by increasing European support at times of positive efforts at democratisation (whether subjective or objective)98, in spite of controversy within the EU regarding the policy to be followed and in spite of real progress made in terms of democratisation, respect for human rights, good governance, etc. In addition, the EU remains convinced that peace is an essential condition for development. The EU’s main aim is to retain a presence in the region, contacts and a minimum of aid flows in order to preserve bilateral relations with the different countries involved in the conflict99.
According to Manahl, the European Union’s regional representative, the conflict in which several of the region’s countries are involved is a complex conflict, involving - above all - determined military leaders acting on the basis of deep ethnic passions, between whom there are shifting alliances. These military leaders operate within a post-Cold War context within countries where the social, political and economic infrastructure as a whole has collapsed. These leaders do not act in accordance with the basic principles signed at Lomé and which link the ACP countries and the EU: they tend rather to take a position in favour of strong power enabling them to impose security first and foremost, then development and, finally, if the conditions are favourable, respect for human rights and democracy101 (even though the EU is not convinced by this method). These conflicts cause very large displacements of refugees, some of whom are armed and who risk destabilising the whole of a region in which other actors intervene for business reasons caused by the wealth of mineral and oil resources, for which several external mediation actors are attempting to resolve the conflict and, finally, in relation to which the EU’s diplomatic approach is derisory and not particularly effective, in spite of sending a special representative to the region. With regard to aid policy, the wars in the different countries have involved large population movements102 and long periods of instability, obliging the EU to review its aid redirecting it towards humanitarian and emergency aid, given the conditions in the region and the nature of the regional crisis103.
The European Union considers it a reassuring sign if the IMF accepts a country's
request for economic reform programmes, particularly when it relates to countries emerging from a cycle of violence (such as Angola, Uganda or Rwanda).
Over the course of the different interviews it became quite clear that acceptance of an IMF programme on the part of a country (structural adjustment or economic reforms…) is a reassuring sign for other multilateral donors and, in particular, for the EU (particularly in relation to countries at war or in a post-conflict situation). This is not a necessary condition but, in the case of the countries involved in the war in the Congo, it is a sufficient sign for resumption of aid. In fact, entry onto an IMF programme means that the country accepts a certain level of IMF control over the way the country is run (financial supervision, internal and external accounting, the IMF has a right to inspect progress in reforms and economic policies pursued, can impose macro-economic criteria to be attained, etc…) and may give other donors the impression that the IMF can truly supervise and ensure implementation of good governance in the country.
Whilst access to an IMF programme is an important signal for other donors, and a sign to which some EU funding is linked, access, access conditions and criteria for continuing an « IMF programme » (even if they are meant to be objective) are subjective and applied on a case by case basis, leading to a policy of double standards (from both a political and economic point of view) for the countries of the Great Lakes region.
The EU’s cooperation policy uses the principles adopted by the IMF as a reference point. The EU provides strong support to the reform programmes implemented by the IMF, either through budgetary support or through financing of health programmes to compensate for the harmful social effects of these social adjustment programmes104. Within the context of these structural adjustment programmes, certain conditionalities are imposed in the form of economic and financial criteria to be attained such as, for example, a certain minimum percentage of social expenditure, a maximum % of military expenditure, a minimum amount of monetary reserves, a certain level of own investment, in short, a level of economic stability. This economic stability argument is also applied differently to the different countries of the region. In the case of Burundi, the IMF conditions resumption of its programmes on a certain macro-economic stability; it is the same for Zimbabwe where economic reform programmes have been suspended, largely due to reasons of economic instability, necessary reforms not being implemented, etc. But in the case of Rwanda and (to a lesser extent) Uganda, macro-economic stability depends crucially on the volumes of aid disbursed, and annually established macro-economic criteria are rarely fully achieved, virtually never in the case of Rwanda. It can be seen that the same arguments are used in some cases to condition the granting or resumption of aid and, in other cases, to justify a resumption or continuation of cooperation.
The involvement of Angola, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi in the Congo war has not led to a suspension of aid on the part of the EU and the IMF programmes, apart from in the case of Zimbabwe where this argument has been used as a factor additional to other problems of economic instability.
The amounts of aid allocated or committed in Uganda, Rwanda and Angola have in no way been modified and the economic programmes linked to debt relief programmes have been continued despite the involvement of these three countries in the war and the high and increasing levels of military expenditure in their budgets.
It clearly seems that, in the case of Uganda, the war has had a positive effect on the country’s economic performance since 1998 and has influenced the attitude of the Bretton Woods institutions with