The Nile Basin Initiative:

Challenges to Implementation

By: Kimberly E. Foulds [1]

The paper was presented at the

Managing Shared Waters Conference

Hamilton, Ontario, Canada

23-28 June 2002

Managing Shared Waters: Lessons Learned II

Location — HCC Room 203

[Part I] [Part II] [Part III]

            The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), and its ambitious goals of establishing regional cooperation and mutually beneficial relationships among all Nile Basin countries (NBCs), [2] functions as a broad program of international importance. The Nile Basin region and related state and regional tensions are of great concern to the international community due to its volatility of and proximity to the Middle East. Further tensions and conflict in nearby regions have the potential to spread through regional uncertainty concerning issues of political, social, and economic stability. Additionally, the NBCs and the international community recognize the importance of developing regional relationships through environmental cooperation because of its potential to spread into other conflict-prone areas where regional collaboration is needed.

            The need for international water agreements continues because of the increasing possibility for water-induced conflict from issues of water scarcity and degradation, which poses as a continual threat to local, state, regional, and international stability. Individual states, armed with sovereign rights to territorial resources, use water to serve political, economic, and social goals. Scholars agree that conflict has the greatest potential to emerge when the downstream (most-vulnerable) nation is militarily stronger than the upstream (water-controlling) nation and it feels its interests are threatened, as in the case of the Nile River. [3]

            Internationally shared bodies of water create political, social, and economic tensions and disputes concerning the distribution and use of resource management. Furthermore, when a resource base extends across a political border, misunderstandings or a lack of agreements about allocations are more likely. [4] The increased potential for conflict intensifies threats to state stability and national security. For example, Richard Ullman provides a broader spectrum of national security threats. He states that security threats include:

Any action or sequence of events that (1) threatens to drastically and over a relatively brief period of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or (2) threatens to narrow the range of policy choices available to a state or private, nongovernmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state. [5]

The threat of water scarcity and subsequent tensions exemplify the relationship between environment and political interests. Change in water usage or development of water resources poses a challenge to the status quo, which, as Ullman argues, threatens to alter the quality of life of the nation and restricts policy options. As Lowi asserts, state security involves the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identities, as well as their physical and functional integrity. [6]   These factors are compromised, however, through adjustments in water development, distribution, and use.

In terms of resource conflict resolution, Conca et al states that progress exists in trying to identify policies for reducing the risks of disputes over water sources that will lead to conflict, as well as in a better understanding of mechanisms for promoting cooperation and collaboration

over shared water resources. [7] They argue that considerable progress has been made both in understanding the nature of the connections between water resources and conflict and in evaluating regional cases where such connections may be particularly strong. [8] Despite progress, they contend:

There is a long way to go before nations or regions produce a common policy agenda or set of initiatives that truly incorporate environmental and resources issues into approaches to reduce the risk of regional and national conflicts. Nevertheless, construction has begun on a new framework that will permit scholars and policymakers to apply new tools, set new priorities, organize responses to a range of environmental threats to peace and security. [9]

Thus, advances in conflict resolution and environmental cooperation function as an emerging platform for national and regional collaboration.

The involvement of third parties, such as the World Bank (WB), the United States, and Canada, in environmental conflicts further complicates the issues of political, social, and economic interests, and hinders regional cooperation. Third parties become active players in environmentally-induced conflicts through the creation of insensible policies and programs. Furthermore, autocratic government control over civil society prevents the emergence of vibrant non-governmental organizations (NGO) with respect to economic projects and political programs. Thus, both domestic and international NGOs are not prevalent, while the influence of third parties strengthens. Implications of the absence of NGOs include a shortage of active community participation in project creation, a lack of micro-level information regarding project development, and a deficiency in day-to-day understandings of the consequences of such projects. Consequently, project designs fail to incorporate community intricacies, which inhibits community subsistence and project success. As a result, large projects like the NBI generate problematic ramifications because of the lack of adequate information, local expertise, and community participation. Local and national NGOs are more aware of the intricacies of the region and its political, social, and economic qualities. The role of third parties, such as the WB, continues to create a schism between the project planners and those individuals directly implicated by its construction or implementation. Therefore, due to the involvement of third parties, the absence of an NGO presence, and the aspects of Nile Basin politics, the NBI will fail to achieve the intricate goals of conflict resolution and regional cooperation.

Lit Review

The argument and focus of debate over the concepts of environment and security has shifted from whether there is a connection between the two to exactly how environmental and resource problems affect regional and international security. Whether or not water scarcity causes outright warfare between nations in the years ahead, it already causes enough violence and conflict within states to threaten social and political stability. As Postel and Wolfe emphasize, today’s civil conflicts have a habit of spilling over borders and becoming tomorrow’s international wars. [10] Furthermore, the causes and consequences of localized environmental damage are becoming increasingly transnationalized.

            According to Conca et al, the tendency to view the problem as local, and as a lesser concern for large-scale violent conflict, ignores the powerful transnational political, social, and economic forces that contribute directly to water-induced tension and conflict. [11] Moreover, as Allan argues, governments are more likely to rely on the exhaustion of the resources to be the evidence that persuades water-using communities that patterns of water use have to change. [12] In these instances, the state and regional government institutions are not strong enough to implement economically and environmentally sound water practices to anticipate and avoid catastrophes. [13] Within these state and regional institutions, however, the broader discourse on water scarcity involves the political, social, and economic influences and consequences of environmental, and in this, instance water-induced conflict.

Political arguments of water scarcity

            The impacts of resource scarcity, specifically water, carry many political implications in local, state, regional, and international spheres. In all water conflicts, according to Haftendorn, there exists an asymmetrical situation “whereby the upper-lying riparian, through means of the hydrological situation, can control the quantity and quality pf the water flow.” [14] Enhancing this approach, Conca et al argues that political actors utilize resources and related scarcity as objects of military and political action. [15] Conditions of the resource and society, however, influence the extent of their influence in such action. These include the degree of scarcity (dependent on natural hydrological cycle and “relative” scarcity caused by high population densities and intensive industrial development), the extent that supply is shared, the relative power of the groups sharing, and the ease of access to alternative resources. [16] Furthermore, a weaker party will seldom provoke, initiate, or prevail with military action against a stronger adversary. If a weaker nation, however, controls a resource or is dependent on resources from other nations, disputes and conflicts may occur. [17]               

            Additionally, many complicated issues of political, social, and economic significance limit the potential for cooperation. Lowi argues that states that are antagonists in “high politics” tend not to agree willingly to collaboration in the sphere of “low politics,” defined as economic and welfare issues. [18] Moreover, she states that “the nation-state will shy away from yielding sovereignty from cooperation and compromising national identity, if it can afford to.” [19] Even if it were possible to show that common management of a shared water resource would in some cases lead to more water for all, it is very difficult to “build up the confidence in a long-standing adversary necessary to embark on that road.” [20] Throughout the 1 990s, research funded by the United States Central Intelligence Agency tested a range of political, economic, and social variables associated with “state failure,” which refers to certain extreme forms of violence, including revolutionary war, ethnic war, adverse or disruptive regime changes, and genocide. [21] The work found no direct relationship between environmental degradation and state failure. Researchers determined that three main factors helped to predict state failure: infant mortality, openness to international trade, and the level of democracy. Resource scarcity, however, was found to affect the main state failure predictors. [22] For example, at a given level of state instability and capacity, a higher deforestation rate meant a greater likelihood of state failure (environmental change in the context of high vulnerability and a low capacity to respond). [23] Thus, while cooperation may be the ideal solution to conflict prediction concerning resource scarcity, state instability as a product of environmental degradation limits regional and international conflict prevention and resolution.

While few scholars would refute the potential conflict in water scarcity among water sources shared internationally, Gleick states that “not all water resource disputes lead to violent conflict. Most lead to negotiations, discussions, and non-violent resolutions.” [24] Frederick furthers the issue of environmental cooperation and conflict, stating that environmental cooperation helps to build peace, but it could be that peace is a prerequisite for environmental cooperation, not a result. [25] Agreeing with Frederick and Gleick, Ohlsson argues that countries, understanding the increased scarcity of water and its necessity, recognize that the real peace potential of water issues will be a “negotiated solution of differences over water allocation, rather than unilateral annexation, because continued conflict is at best a zero-sum game. Furthermore, successful resolution should initiate a positive spiral whereby a number of other ingrained conflict patterns could start to dissolve.” [26] Conca et al expands on this argument, explaining that environmental cooperation has the potential to reduce tensions, broaden regional cooperation, foster demilitarization, and to promote norms of peaceful dispute resolution. [27] While the potential for environmental conflict carries many national and regional benefits, the existence of such conflict resolution is achieved prior the realization of environmental cooperation. Thus, while Ohlsson and Conca et al state that environmental collaboration generates conflict resolution in other areas of concern, they fail to realize the depth of scarcity conflicts in terms of political and economic influence of surrounding states.

While some academics maintain that tensions and conflicts arising from resource scarcity will lead to cooperation and possible resolution of other regional conflicts, Haftendorn argues, “The asymmetrical structure of water conflict excludes the possibility of a cooperative solution.” [28] She further asserts:

The settlement of conflict will be determined by the structure of the conflict and not the causes. Water conflict needs to be tied to other problems in order to seek a manner in which to replace the asymmetrical structure to a more cooperative symmetrical structure. A new structure allows for the possibilities of trade-offs between economic, ecological,  social, and political benefits. [29]

Therefore, unless water conflict serves as a component of a greater conflict, cooperation will never be achieved. In contrast to Haftendorn’s assumptions and recommendations for water conflict resolution, Homer-Dixon asserts that scarcity rarely contributes to interstate conflict. It can, however, have significant indirect effects on the international community, encourage powerful groups to capture vulnerable resources, and force marginal groups to migrate to ecologically sensitive areas. [30] Homer-Dixon refers to these processes as “resource capture” and “ecological marginalization” and argues that they reinforce environmental scarcity and raise the potential for social instability. [31] In spite of these processes, he maintains that environmental scarcity creates conflict. The impacts of migration, regional power struggles, and instability within the international community provide real elements of intra and interstate conflicts.

Social arguments of water scarcity

While many scholars maintain that water scarcity has the greatest potential for instability in the political sphere, others insist that social inequalities in water distribution, use, and development create a much greater problem in establishing cooperation and avoiding local, state, regional, and international tensions and conflicts. According to Gleick, “Considering the principal forces that conspire to create scarcity and its potential to incite conflict or dispute, it appears that unequal distribution often plays the most important role.” [32] As Haftendorn states, in contrast to a conflict arising over pollution, which can result in tension between the states, a conflict of distribution can lean towards violence or military threats. [33] Frederick recommends that policy aimed at achieving a sense of equity should include “the formalization of historic patterns of use among all parties, which may be a more realistic short-term goal than efficiency in settling international disputes.” [34] Therefore, as Frederick argues, by recognizing historical inequalities in distribution and use that have accompanying social implications, there is increased potential for the creation of a long-term solution to just water allocations among shared users.

Conca et al state that nations with limited supplies or low levels of economic development may use fewer than 100 m³ per person per year. Nations with extensive irrigated agriculture withdraw more than 1500 m³ per person per year. For instance, water consumption in the US and the UK is 2200 m³ and 510 m³ per person per year, respectively. [35] Research confirmed than the effects of low levels of water use include adverse impacts on health, constraints on industrial and commercial activities, and inability to grow sufficient food for local populations. [36] Sandra Postel asserts that, as annual water availability drops below 1,700 m³ per person, domestic self-sufficiency becomes almost impossible.” [37] Food insecurity is a political concern, leading to economic weakness and other regional problems.

Adverse consequences of water development and use complicate social concerns, which include contamination of downstream water supplies, dislocation of people because of dam construction, and the destruction of local fisheries that support local populations. Land degradation combined with a growing pressure on water resources is a key category of environmentally induced conflicts. These factors exert strong pressure on peasants, pastoralists, and nomads, heightening conflict among themselves and with encroaching commercial interests and central governments. [38] Additionally, competition over scarce resources often leads to conflicts along the lines of sectarian differences.

Decreases in quality and quantity, population growth, and unequal resource access act to increase water scarcity for certain population groups, cropland, forests, and fish. This can reduce economic productivity, both for the local groups experiencing the scarcity and for the larger regional and national economies. The affected people may migrate or be expelled to new lands. Migrating groups often trigger ethnic conflicts when they move to new areas, while loss of income due to dislocation can cause insurgency and rural rebellion. A 1991 study of the Horn of Africa by the World Conservation Union found that “the disenfranchisement of local peoples from traditional land and water rights has been a major factor fueling conflict and instability.” [39] Particularly in developing countries, the migrations and productivity losses that eventually weaken the state may in turn decrease central control over ethnic rivalries and increase opportunities for insurgents and elites challenging state authority. [40] Conca et al adds that additional inequities in water use and development increase local, regional, and international disputes, create refugees, and decrease the ability of a nation or society to resist economic and military aggression. [41]

Environmental scarcity generates intermediate social effects like poverty and migration that are interpreted as a conflict’s immediate cause. The intermediate social effects, including constrained economic productivity, population movements, social segmentation, and the weakening of states, can cause ethnic conflicts, insurgencies, and coups d’etat. [42] Societies can adapt to environmental scarcity by using indigenous environmental resources more effectively or by reducing their dependence on these resources. The capacity to adapt, according to Homer-Dixon, depends on the supply of social and technical “ingenuity” available in the society. If adaptation is unsuccessful, environmental scarcity sharpens existing distinctions among social groups. [43]

Economic arguments of water scarcity

In order to create solutions to conflicts concerning water scarcity, distribution, and use, economic growth traditionally has been seen as the principal means for achieving broad development objectives. [44] According to Anthony Giddens (1990), social theorists, by utilizing industrial modernity, argue that economic development enables new environment and economics aware resource managing options to be contemplated and implemented. [45] Development now has the potential to be both economically feasible and environmentally sustainable, and the two interests can complement each other in development options. Thus, these theorists claim that “resource reconstructing practices replace resource-degrading practices.” [46] The existence of highly valued resources in abundance can be the predominant factor in the development of a nation or region as indicated by the case of petroleum-producing countries. It will be expected that any nation with a relative abundance of resources would possess a significant development advantage where other factors are equal. A scarcity of one or more key resources would constitute a significant disadvantage. Actual contribution of natural resources depends on the availability of capital and human resource capabilities. The absence of these factors can produce a situation where abundance of potential resources does not result in substantial development. [47] In addition, the potential of international trade to acquire specific resources and resource substitution of those in short supply alters the impact of available resource supplies. Thus, as Cox asserts, “resource scarcity need not serve as an insurmountable obstacle to development, and several resource-poor nations have achieved high levels of economic growth and development.” [48]

According to Cox, political issues and resource use within international relations interfere with state economic development. In utilizing the dependency theory, he explains that through the maintenance of trade patterns and current economic activity, developing nations exist in a position of dependency under the guise of the economic prowess of the developed world, which prevents the process of political, economic, and social development. [49] Despite Cox’s assertions, Postel and Wolfe argue that greater assistance to governments from international agencies in carrying out policy and management reform in the name of development could help lessen the likelihood of future water conflicts. “Letting globalization loose in the form of poorly regulated privatization of water services or unconstrained private funding of dam construction will use more problems than they solve.” [50] They state that strong institutions and treaties “providing effective monitoring and enforcement are remarkably resilient,” holding even when the signatories are engaged in hostilities over non-water issues. Long-term programs of joint fact-finding, technical cooperation, and other initiatives that establish a climate of cooperation among countries can pave the way for resolving disputes when they do arise. [51]

Furthermore, where water conservation and productivity improvements eliminate the need for a new dam or river diversion, they also address a major source of tension and conflict. [52] Gleick agrees with the economic harm of large-scale development water-induced conflicts. He argues that schemes like irrigation and hydroelectric facilities often lead to the displacement of large local populations, adverse impacts on downstream water users, changes in control over local resources, and economic dislocations. These impacts may lead to disputes among ethnic or economic groups, between urban and rural populations, and across borders. [53]